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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
S. H. BENNION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SHELL OIL COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation, and
UTAH STATE BOARD OF OIL,
GAS AND MINING,

Case No. 18345

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
SHELL OIL COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant S. H. Bennion appeals from a judgment of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, affirming an order of
the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining concerning Mr.
Bennion's right to share in production from a well operated by
respondent Shell Oil Company (hereinafter "Shell").
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
S. H. Bennion commenced this action in the District
Court on June 10, 1981, seeking review of an order of the Utah
State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining issued on April 30, 1981.
(R.2).

In August 1981, Bennion filed a motion for summary

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment asserting in effect that the order of the Board should
be reversed as a matter of law.

(R. 110).

In November 1981,

Shell moved for summary judgment contending that the Board's
order should be affirmed as a matter of law.

(R. 137).

On

December 29, 1981, the parties presented oral argument on their
respective motions (R. 183 et seq.), after which the District
Court took the case under advisement.

On March 8, 1982, the

District Court entered its Judgment and Order of Dismissal
granting Shell's motion, denying Bennion's motion, and affirming the order of the Board in its entirety.

(R. 172)

23, 1982, Bennion filed his notice of this appeal.

On March

(R. 177).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Shell seeks an order of the Court affirming the judgment of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in Bennion's brief is incomplete in certain respects and misleading in others.

The fol-

lowing, therefore, is a summary of all of the pertinent facts
established in the administrative record and in proceedings
before the District Court.
I. THE DRILLING UNIT AND COMMENCEMENT
OF THE TEW-1B5 WELL
On June 24, 1971, the Board ordered that Section 1,
Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special Meridian, be
established as an oil and gas drilling unit.

The order, as
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amended in 1972, authorized the drilling of one well on the
drilling unit.*

S. H. Bennion owns an undivided 25 percent

mineral interest in one eighth of the section; .his interests
extend to 2.94898 percent of the entire unit.

The remaining

working interests in the unit are owned or leased by seven
individuals or corporations, including Shell.

In June 1973,

Shell notified all seven other working interest owners, including Bennion, that it proposed to drill a well in the unit.
(Shell Ex. l).**

In December 1973, Shell sent to all of the

working interest owners a proposed operating agreement.
Ex. F).

(Shell

This operating agreement, prepared on a standard form

in common use in the area, named Shell as operator and provided
for the sharing of expenses and proceeds, if any, from the well
to be drilled.

* The Board's orders were entered in Cause No. 139-3. Subsections (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of section 40-6-6, Utah
Code Ann.
(1982 Repl. Vol.), authorize the Board to establish
drilling units so as to prevent waste of oil or gas, to avoid
the drilling of unnecessary wells, or to protect correlative
rights.
The size and shape of such units is to approximate
"the maximum area that can be efficiently and economically
drained by one well." The drilling of any well in the unit
other than the one authorized by the order is unlawful.
** References in this brief to exhibits, letters, orders or
transcripts are all to portions of the administrative record
certified by the Board to the District Court. The documents in
the administrative record are neither indexed nor numbered.
They are contained in two large envelopes on file in the office
of the Clerk of this Court.
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Shell and six of the other working interest owners in
0

the unit signed Shell's proposed operating agreement, dated
December 14, 1973.

(Shell Ex. 8).

The only working interest

owner who refused to sign the agreement was Mr.
advised Shell:

Bennion, who

"I don't want to become involved whatever, with

your Company in t_his venture."

(Shell Ex. 5).

Shell therefore

represented in the operating agreement that it would pay
Bennion's share of expenses in drilling and operating the well.
The well, which bore the designation Tew-lBS, was commenced on December 20, 1973, and was completed as a producer on
July 7, 1974.

The well is located on land in which Shell owns

100 percent of the working interest.

It is located more than

one quarter mile away from any land in which Bennion owns an
interest.

In May 1976, proceeds from the well's production

became sufficient to pay drilling and related costs; in other
words, the well's "payout" occurred in that month.

The well

has continued production since that time.
II. BENNION'S INITIAL APPLICATION FOR
FORCED POOLING AND HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH
SHELL
On February 24, 1975, Bennion applied to the Board for
"forced pooling" of the unit.*

After a hearing date was set

* Subsections (g) and (h) of section 40-6-6 authorize the
working interest owners in a unit to agree on the terms for
sharing expenses and proceeds from a well.
(Continued)
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in Cause No. 139-13 so initiated, Bennion'~ attorney notified
the Board that he wished an indefinite continuance.

(Letter

from S. G. Crockett to the Board dated March 18, 1975).

Sev-

eral months later Mr. Bennion asked the Board to reschedule the
hearing, but then again asked that the hearing be continued
without date.

(Letter from S. H. Bennion to the Board dated

August 25, 1975).

Over the next several years Bennion and

Shell negotiated sporadically concerning Bennion's right to
participate in production from the well, and the percentage of
his interest in the unit.

Bennion consistently refused to sign

agreements proposed by Shell, and he refused to pay his share
of costs or operating expenses on the terms to which the other
working interest owners had agreed.

Not only did he refuse to

sign the operating agreement proposed by Shell and signed by
the other owners.

(Shell Ex. 8).

He also refused to sign a

division order proposed by Shell (Shell Ex. 7) and a one-page
letter agreement prepared by Shell in response to his contention that the operating agreement was too long (Shell Ex. 10).
In December 1975 Bennion tendered payment to Shell of his alleged share of expenditures, but the payment was conditioned

(Note continued.) In the absence of agreement, these
subsections authorize a "nonconsenting" owner like Bennion to
seek an order of the Board decreeing the owner's rights in a
share of production from the well, after the operator's
recoupment of expenses.
Such orders are called "forced
pooling" orders.
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upon Shell's agreement that his share in the unit was greater

.

than Shell -- and later the Board -- believed to be the case.*
(Shell Ex. 14).

Shell had no alternative but to refuse

Bennion's tender.

(Shell Ex. 15).

During these negotiations, Bennion made it clear to
Shell that he would not voluntarily participate in the payment
of expenses until he was entitled to take what he believed to
be his working interest percentage of production in kind from
the date of first production.

(See,

~·

Shell Ex. 14).

In

short, Bennion was unwilling to accept cash payments from Shell
for his alleged share of past production.
1979, at 30-31).

(Tr. of Oct.24,

Shell consistently refused to pay Bennion in

kind back to first production from the well because the parties could not agree on Bennion's percentage interest in the
well, and because, in Shell's view, payment in kind long after
production started would be unfair to it and other working interest owners.

Shell believed that payment in kind would, in

effect, have rewarded Bennion with dramatically increased oil
prices even though he had refused to shoulder the risks of
development along with Shell and the other working interest

*

Bennion contended that he owned a working interest of 3.125
percent of the unit.
Shell believed that his working interest
amounted to 2.94898 percent.
In its Order in Cause No. 139-13,
dated April 30, 1981, the Board concluded that Bennion's interest was as Shell contended.
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owners.

For these reasons, and because Shell and Bennion dis-

agreed on other matters, the two never reached an accord.
Between September 1975 and June 1979, ·Bennion made no
effort to bring his grievances against Shell before the Board.
Until 1979 he made no effort to press his application for
forced pooling of the unit.
III. BENNION'S AMENDED APPLICATION
AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON
On June 7, 1979, Bennion filed an amended application
in Cause No. 139-13, in which he again asked the Board to order
the forced pooling of the unit, to require Shell to deliver his
alleged share of production in kind from the date of first production, and to require Shell to produce its records of drilling costs and operating expenses.

After hearings on July 26,

1979, and October 24, 1979, the Board entered an Interim Order
(dated October 24, 1979), requiring Shell to pay expenses for
Bennion, his lawyer and his accountant to travel to Houston,
Texas, to review Shell's books and records concerning production and costs of drilling.

This order was entered even though

Shell had previously provided Bennion with complete summaries
of revenues and expenses from the Tew-1B5 well (Bennion Ex.
A-5, Shell Ex. 6, Shell Ex. 12), with a complete audit of the
well conducted by Tenneco Oil Company, one of the other working
interest owners (Shell Ex. 16 and Shell Ex. 23), and with supplemental expense and revenue information requested by Bennion's
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accountants (Shell Ex. 18).
0

0

Bennion did not avail himself of the opportunity to
examine Shell's records at Shell's expense.

Rather, he engaged

the Houston office of his own accounting firm to audit Shell's
records.

On July 9, 1980, Bennion's Houston accountants re-

ported that they had reviewed Shell's records but that they
could not certify their audit because certain production records were not "readily" available to them and because "the
complexity of gas plant cost accounting systems" did not justify a complete review.

Mr. Bennion's accountants, however,

reached the "tentative" conclusion that Shell's accounts of
Bennion's interest overpaid Bennion by more than $5,000.
(Letter from Main Hurdman
July 9, 1980).

& Cranstoun

to Peter Stirba dated

In any event, Bennion's attorney was unable to

offer the Board evidence indicating that Shell's records or
summaries short-changed his account.

(Tr. of Dec. 18, 1980 at

34-35).
On March 26, 1980, the Board entered a second interim
order in Cause No. 139-13, this one based upon a stipulation
between Shell and Bennion.

The order stated first that all

interests in the unit would be pooled effective July 26, 1979,
the date of the initial hearing in Cause No.

139-13.

Second,

the order provided that Bennion would be entitled to receive
his proportionate share of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons
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produced from the well in kind, but only from the effective
date of the pooling order, and only upon Bennion's payment of
his share of Shell's operating expenses.

Third, the order pro-

vided that Shell would pay to the Board $72,222.41, which Shell
had calculated as Bennion's share of total net revenue from the
well from the date of first production to the effective date of
the pooling order.

(This sum was made up of (1) a cost-free

royalty equalling one-eighth of Bennion's working interest,
computed from first production until ''payout" in May 1976, and
(2) a working interest share of proceeds after payout, less
Bennion's proportionate share of expenses.)

Finally, the order

provided that it was entered without prejudice to Bennion's
claims that he should receive more than a 2.9489 percent working interest, and that he should receive payment in kind
(rather than in cash) for production prior to the effective
date of the pooling order.

These claims were to be addressed

later.
On December 18, 1980, the Board conducted its third
and final hearing in Cause No. 139-13, following which it issued the order that is the subject of this appeal.

That final

order, dated April 30, 1981, held in pertinent part that since
Shell was willing to let Bennion share in the well's cash proceeds from first production to the effective date of the pooling order, Bennion would be entitled to the $72,222.41 previously paid to the Board.

But the Board held that Bennion was
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not entitled to a share of production in kind for that
period.

.

The Board likewise rejected Benni~n's other claims

against Shell.
On June 8, 1981, Bennion filed his complaint in this
case, asking the District Court to set aside the Board's April
30 order on the ground that it was "unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary, capricious, without legal or factual basis, and otherwise constitutes an abuse of the Board's discretion.''

As noted

above, the District Court rejected Bennion's contentions and
affirmed the Board's last order in its entirety.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT MAY ONLY SET ASIDE THE
BOARD'S DISCRETIONARY DETERMINATIONS
IF IT CONCLUDES THAT THE BOARD
ACTED ARBITRARILY OR CAPRICIOUSLY
This appeal raises important questions of first impression concerning construction of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann.

§40-6-1 et seq.

(1982 Repl. Vol.),

together with equally important questions concerning the scope
of the Board's discretion in matters committed to its expertise.

The Board exercised its discretion -- we believe soundly

-- in holding that S. H.

Bennion was not entitled to receive

oil and gas in kind as his share of past production.
Part II B of this argument.)

(See

The Board also exercised its

sound discretion in refusing to require Shell to deliver its

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

well records to Salt Lake City.

(See Part V.)

Bennion seeks

reversal of both determinations.
In resolving the issues on appeal, therefore, the
Court must not only construe the Act but also apply established
standards governing review of discretionary administrative
orders.

In other words, the Court must pay the decisions of

the Board the degree of deference usually owed to administrative agencies expert in a complex regulatory field:
"In the field of administrative law the assumption is indulged that the administrator (or administrative tribunal) possesses superior knowledge and expertise because of specialized training and experience, and the focus of interest
within the particular field.
For this reason the
well-established rule is that the courts indulge
him considerable latitude in determinations he
makes on questions of fact and also in the exercise of his discretion with respect to the responsibilities which the law imposes upon him; and
they will not interfere therewith unless it ap_pears that he acted in excess of his powers, or
that he so abused his discretion that his action
was capricious or arbitrary."
Central Bank

& Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 18, 497

P.2d 638, 641 (1972) (footnotes omitted).

Accord:

Beirne v.

Mitchell, 587 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1978); Hardy v. State Tax
Commission, 561 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Utah 1977);

Peatross v.

Board of Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976).
The Board conducted three hearings in this case.
considered many pages of briefs submitted by the parties.

It
The

members of the Board brought their collective expert judgment

-11-
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to bear on Mr. Bennion's grievances in rendering the three
written decisions in the administrative record.

Unless Bennion

can demonstrate a violation of the Oil and Gas.,Conservation Act
or that the Board acted arbitrarily, this Court must affirm the
District Court's ruling.
II.
BENNION IS NOT ENTITLED TO PAYMENT
OF OIL AND GAS IN KIND
In Parts I, II and III of his brief, Bennion sets
forth his position on the most important issue in this appeal:
whether a

mineral interest owner who refuses to enter into a

voluntary pooling arrangement with the operator of a stateordered drilling unit is entitled to retroactive payment of his
share of production in kind.

Shell, of course, voluntarily

paid Bennion his share from the date of first production in
cash.

Bennion, however, contends that section 40-6-6 of the

Oil and Gas Conservation Act

and the Utah Constitution require

the Board to order payment in kind.
There are two serious problems with this contention.
First, Bennion has no statutory, constitutional or common law
right to any payment whatsoever -- whether in cash or in kind
-- for his presumed share of production between the date of
first production and the effective date of the Board's pooling
order.

Second, retroactive payment to Bennion in kind would

reward him with a windfall for refusing to take the risks borne
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by Shell and six other working interest owners and for refusing
to take the simple steps established by the Oil and Gas Conservation Act to share in the well' s production.

.If Bennion is

right in asking for payment in kind years after the fact, then
working interest owners will have no inducement to comply with
the terms of the Act, and the Act itself will become a dead
letter.
A.

Bennion Has No Right to Payment Measured
Retroactively From the Date of the Forced
Pooling Order

One of the purposes of Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation
Act was to provide a means by which mineral interest owners
could share in oil and gas drained from their property by wells
on adjacent property.

Before the Act, mineral owners in that

position had no judicial remedy against their neighbors.

In

other words, a neighbor who drilled a well on his own land and
who drained the pool had just as much right to the oil as the
person from whose property it migrated toward the well.

This

rule, known as the "rule of capture," prevailed in most jurisdictions and presumably in Utah as well.

See McKay and

Conder, "Statutory Needs in Utah Oil and Gas Law," 1950 Utah L.
Rev. 33, 34.

See also 1 Williams

& Meyers,

Oil

& Gas

Law

§204.4 at 55-56 (1981); Desormeaux. v. Inexco Oil Co., 298
So.2d 897 (La. App. 1974), writ ref., 302 So.2d 37 (1974).
"If an adjoining owner drills his own land and taps a deposit
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of oil or gas, extending under his neighbor's field, so that it
0

comes into his well, it becomes his property."
Spillman, 155 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1895).

Brown v.

The only remedy of the

adjoining landowner was to drill a well on his own land to capture as much of the pool as he could.

1 Williams

& Meyers,

~

cit., at 57.
The Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act changed the
"rule of capture" to this extent:

Where a spacing order or

drilling order is entered permitting only one well on a unit
covering separately owned parcels, the non-drilling mineral
owner may obtain a share of the oil or gas in one of two specific ways.

He may agree with the other mineral owners in the

unit on a basis of sharing, thus voluntarily pooling the unit.
See Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6(f) (1982 Repl. Vol.).

Or he may

petition the Board for an order compelling the pooling of all
interests in the unit, thus force pooling the unit.
§40-6-6(f) and (g).

See
id.
- --

If the mineral owner does neither, he is

left where he was before the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, that
is, with no rights in oil for which he has not drilled.

Thus,

the rule of capture continues to apply to any owner who neglects to avail himself of the remedies in the Act.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has never had occasion
to consider the question, this has been the repeated conclusion
of courts in other jurisdictions with conservation acts like
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Utah's.

See,~-, Gruger v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 135
6

P.2d 485, 488 (Okla. 1943) ("The law of capture ... still obtains ..• except as it has been or may be regu~ated or restricted under the laws passed in the exercise of the police
power ....

[Those laws] simply authorize administrative boards

to issue orders that have the effect of regulating or abrogating in a measure the law of capture."); California Co. v.
Britt, 154 So.2d 144, 147-48 (Miss. 1963); Anderson v.
Ellison, 285 F.2d 484, 486 (10th Cir. 1960) ("without the
spacing statute and the Commission's pooling order he would
have no right to share in the oil and gas produced from the
well."); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n., 239 P.2d 1023,
1026 (Okla 1950).
Bennion's assertion of a vested right to a share of
production from commencement of the well simply ignores the
rule of capture and its relation to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act.

He infers from subparagraphs (g) and (h) of section

40-6-6 of the Act that he is entitled as a matter of right to a
share in production irrespective of any order of the Board and
irrespective of any voluntary pooling arrangement to which he
may agree.

But these provisions refer in their entirety to the

contents of forced pooling orders which are issued by the board
and which become effective when the Board specifies.

These

provisions do not refer, as Bennion supposes, to rights of

-15-
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landowners that exist independently of th~ Board's pooling
0

orders.
In short, Bennion's share of production originated
with the forced pooling order of the Board.
accrue or vest before the Board's order.

It did not exist,

Precisely the same is

true of Bennion's one-eighth "landowner's royalty."*

In as-

serting a "right" to production in kind before the effective
date of the Board's pooling order, Bennion mistakes the source
of his entitlement.

The Oil and Gas Conservation Act is clear

that Bennion had no such right to share in production before
the effective date of the Board's order, which created and
determined his share in the pool.
Although it had no legal obligation to do so, therefore, Shell paid Bennion more than $72,000 as his share of production receipts from the date of first production to the effective date of the pooling order.

Shell made this payment

voluntarily in an attempt to honor previous offers to Bennion,
in an attempt to induce Bennion's cooperation, and in an attempt to treat him fairly.

But Shell is convinced, on the

* Like the nonconsenting mineral owner's working interest
share, his "landowner's royalty" originates with an order of
the Board and does not accrue independently of proceedings before the Board.
Subparagraph (h) of section 40-6-6 provides
that "under a pooling order ... a non-consenting owner of a
tract in a drilling unit ... shall be deemed to have a basic
landowner's royalty of 1/8, or 12-1/2%, of the production allocated to such tract."
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basis of the foregoing statutes and other authorities, that it
had no obligation to share with Bennion in the proceeds of
production before the effective date of the Board's pooling
order.

Since it had no such obligation, it could hardly be

saddled with the more severe obligation to pay Bennion in kind.
B.
It Would be Neither Just Nor Reasonable for
Bennion to Receive Retroactive Payment in Kind
The Board ordered Shell to pay Bennion his working
interest in kind after July 26, 1979, the effective date of
the pooling order.

Bennion complains, in effect, that the

Board's refusal to make this order retroactive to the time of
first production was an abuse of discretion.

The Board, how-

ever, is obligated to issue pooling orders on ''terms and conditions that are just and reasonable."
§40-6-6(f) (1982 Repl. Vol.).

Utah Code Ann.

Bennion's request for retroac-

tive payment in kind was neither just nor reasonable.
Bennion argues, in effect, that he should receive the
advantage of 1982 oil and gas prices for his share of production beginning in 1974.

Sheli and the other working interest

owners, of course, obtained their share of production as production occurred and at the lower prices that prevailed at that
time.

Bennion demands the advantage of increased oil prices

even though he refused to undertake the risks of development
along with the other working interest owners and even though he
wait- ed years to obtain an order of the Board establishing his

-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

interest.

Indeed, Bennion waited seven years after Shell pro\

posed a cooperative agreement for drilling the unit and six and
a half years after production began before he asked the Board
to take action on his application for a forced pooling.

During

this entire period Shell was willing to share its production
with Bennion on the same terms as to which the other working
interest owners agreed.

But Bennion refused to cooperate and

to pay his share of development expenses -- not, we submit,
merely because he was obstreperous.

Rather he wished.to let

the others risk their money in drilling the well which, if suecessful, would benefit him.

As the years passed and the price

of oil and gas climbed dramatically through the mid-1970's,
Bennion saw the opportunity to reap a windfall at the expense
of the other working interest owners, by demanding payment of
his alleged proportionate share in new oil and new gas.
Bennion played a similar waiting game and made similar demands
in at least ten other units in eastern Utah.*

But the Board

* Bennion made similar claims against Gulf Oil Corporation, as
operator of ten other units in Duchesne County in which Bennion
refused to pool his interest voluntarily. In those units, as
in this case, Bennion waited for years to demand retroactively his share of production in kind. As in the present
case, the Board refused Bennion's requests holding:
"The applicant has failed to bring the present petition before the
Board until several years after the drilling units were first
initiated ....
[A]pplicant had several opportunities to participate in voluntary pooling arrangements on these properties.
Failure to either petition the Board or take other action at an
earlier date has jeopardized applicant's equitable position .... "
Order in In re Bennion, Cause No. 139-18 (Jan. 24, 1980) at 4.
-18-
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.

refused to let Bennion succeed here, as in those units, because
his failure to obtain a forced pooling order promptly at the
outset of the well's development jeopardized his equitable
position.
Courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly rejected
similar claims on the same equitable grounds.

For example, the

Nebraska Supreme Court in Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168
N.W.2d 510, 518 (Neb. 1969), held:
"Plaintiff was given every opportunity to secure
his just and equitable share of the oil in the
pool by being offered fair, reasonable and equitable participation with the other interested
parties in [the unit]. He refused to participate
as he had every right to do. As an oil operator
we must assume that he was fully aware of the
consequences of his refusal. While we agree he
had a perfect right to refuse to join the project, he should not be rewarded because he did.
Neither should he be permitted to recover what he
would have received if he had assumed the risks
.of the project. To hold either way would serve
to defeat the purpose of our conservation act . .

"
Accord:

Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Corp., supra; Superior Oil

Co. v. Humble Oil

& Rfg.

Co., 165 So.2d 905, 910-11 (La. App.

1964); Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, 327 P.2d 699, 702
(Okla. 1958); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, 239
P.2d at 1026.

See also United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v.

Premier Resources, Ltd., 511 F.Supp. 127, 131 (W.D. Okla.
1980).
Bennion relies upon two cases for the proposition that
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he is entitled to production in kind from the date of first
production.

.

Neither case, however, supports Bennion's posi-

tion; in fact both cases demonstrate its legal.and equitable
flaws.

In the first of those cases, Ward v. Corporation

Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972), the court held that a nondrilling owner was entitled to participate in the proceeds of
production, but only back to the date upon which the administrative agency's spacing order was issued.

(Under an Oklahoma

statute, the statutory royalty is pooled as of the date of the
spacing order.)

Since the subject well produced for months

before the spacing order was entered, the Ward court in effeet affirmed an order denying the type of relief that Bennion
seeks here.

More importantly, the nonconsenting owner in Ward

did not seek production in kind, and the court's decision had
nothing to do with that issue.
In the other case Bennion cites, In re Application of
Farmers Irrigation District, 194 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1972), the
Nebraska court held that a pooling order was correctly made
retroactive to the date of first production from the well.

The

court, however, was careful to limit its ruling to avoid exactly the type of claim that Bennion now makes.

At the close of

its opinion the court in Farmers Irrigation District stated:
''We do not mean to say that this [i.e. retroactive pooling] should be done in every instance.
All pertinent factors affecting the particular
case under review must be considered. There is
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ordinarily no good reason why an adjoining owner
should not ask for a voluntary pooling agreement
at the time his neighbor starts to drill and
thereby share in the expense, as well as in production, whether or not the well proves successful.
The statutes clearly intend that rights
shall be resolved upon an equitable basis. To
permit an adjoining owner to sit back and await
the successful outcome of drilling operations
without asking for a pooling agreement would
place the entire risk and the entire expense upon
the party drilling in the event of an unsuccess
ful operation. This would ordinarily be inequitable and not justify a retroactive order.
[The Nebraska statute comparable to section
40-6-6] contemplates that when an adjoining owner
fails to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement, a spacing and pooling order may be entered
on the application of any interested party. The
drilling party may recover the share of the expense allocated to the adjoining owner by deducting it from the adjoining owner's share of the
oil or gas produced. This enhances the risk
taken by the drilling party who may encounter a
dry well and is a factor which must also be considered in weighing equities." (Emphasis added.)
194 N.W. 2d at 792.

Bennion not only "sat back and awaited the

successful outcome of drilling operations;" he has also awaited
the escalation of oil and gas prices so as to press a claim for
payment in kind at the most advantageous moment.

Significant-

ly, the landowner in Farmers Irrigation District was not permitted to share production in kind, but only the proceeds of
production.

See 194 N.W.2d at 789.

Bennion, then, has given the Court no authority for
his claims in this case.

He has failed to show the Court a

single instance in which a non-drilling mineral interest owner
was permitted production in kind retroactively from the date of

-21Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

first production.

He has not advanced a single reason which,
0

in equity, would entitle him to that extraordinary relief.

And

he has most assuredly not shown that the Board~s decision was
arbitrary or capricious.
C.

The Word "Production" in Section 40-6-6
Does Not Entitle Bennion to Payment
In Kind Back to First Production

Bennion asserts (at page 11 of his brief) that section
40-6-6(g)'s use of the phrase "share of production" signifies a
legislative "mandate" that the Board's pooling orders must
grant nonconsenting owners a share of oil and gas in kind and
forecloses the Board from ordering such owners to share in the
cash proceeds of production.

Bennion's interpretation of the

statute is wrong because he has an incorrect conception of the
meaning of the word "production."

Bennion's interpretation of

the statute, moreover, would defeat the essential goals of the
Oil and Gas Conservation Act.
In the first place, "production" does not always or
even usually mean "product."

The word "production" is often

used to refer to the value of production or the process of producing.

Thus "production taxes" (a term frequently used to

denote taxes like the Utah mining occupation tax, the Utah oil
and gas conservation gas, or the Utah ad valorem tax) refers
to taxes based on the value of production.

See,

~·

15

U.S.C. §3320(a) (providing for producer reimbursement of severance, production or similar taxes levied on "production of

-22Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

natural gas").

Section 40-6-6(g) itself contemplates exactly

this use of the term "production" by requ'iring costs of surface
equipment, drilling and operation to be subtracted "from the
nonconsenting owner's share of production."

Bennion's own law-

yers use "production" in this sense when they tell the Court:
"[T]he issue before this Court is not whether or not Mr.
Bennion is entitled to receive production prior to the date of
the entry of the pooling order ... but rather whether or not he
is entitled to receive production in kind."
Brief at 8).

(Appellant's

In short, the word "production" does not neces-

sarily mean ''product" unless the qualifying words "in kind" are
added.
In the second place, the Oil and Gas Conservation
Act's essential goal of inducing owners to agree promptly with
operators as to the division of costs and production would be
frustrated if the Board had no choice but to require retroactive sharing of production in kind in its pooling orders.

If

this were the rule, every owner would (like Bennion) simply
.refuse to risk his money for drilling costs, would wait until
the operator completed a successful well, and would continue to
wait until the price of oil increased, before approaching the
Board for a pooling order.

The Oil and Gas Conservation Act

cannot be interpreted in a way that rewards owners for refusing
to comply with the Act.

This was the point of the Nebraska
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court's decision in In re Application of Farmers Irrigation
District, supra, cited by Bennion in support of his position.
D.

The Board's Order Does Not Violate B.ennion' s
Right to "Possess and Protect Property"
With no pertinent authority to support him, Bennion

makes the sweeping charge that the Board's order denies him the
right to "possess and protect property" guaranteed in Article
I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.

Significantly, Bennion

does not contend that he has been insufficiently compensated
for his share of oil and gas production for periods before the
effective date of the Board's pooling order.

Rather he argues

that the Board's refusal to award him retroactive payment in
kind denied him the "liberty to contract with others respecting
the use to which he may subject his property."

(Appellant's

Brief at 17-18).
The first problem with this contention is that Bennion
never raised this argument in the District Court or before the
Board, but raises it for the first time on appeal.

The general

rule in this jurisdiction is, of course, that "matters not
raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."
Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 203-04, 381 P.2d 84, 86
(1963).

There is reason to depart from that rule in the pre-

sent case.
More fundamentally, the Board deprived Bennion of
nothing; certainly the Board did not prevent him from entering
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into whatever contracts he wished for the ~ale of his propor0

tionate share of oil and gas from Shell's well.

If Bennion

wished to take his oil and gas in kind and to .~ell it as it was
produced, he had only to do one of two things.

First, he could

have entered into an operating agreement with Shell and the
other working interest owners before production began.

In this

connection, the December 14, 1973 operating agreement executed
by those other working interest owners inequivocally gave each
party the right to take oil and gas in kind.
6).

(Shell Ex. 8 at

Second, Bennion could have obtained a forced pooling order

from the Board, thus establishing his interest in the unit,
before production began or at least during the early years of
production.

But Bennion availed himself of neither option.

If

anyone deprived Bennion of the opportunity to sell "his" oil
and gas, .that person was Bennion himself.
Perhaps the simplest answer to Bennion's constitutional claim is that Bennion received the full cash value of his
alleged share of production from the first day of production,
that is, $72,222.41.

In receiving the full cash value of his

alleged share, Bennion has already received more than he is
entitled to receive under the provisions of section 40-6-6 and
proportionately more than Shell and the other working interest
owners received.

Without taking any of the risk borne by Shell

and the others, Bennion has nevertheless been paid not only his
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net share of revenue but a one-eighth royalty for production up
0

to the payout date -- a royalty that the other working interest
owners had no right to receive.

Under these circumstances,

Bennion cannot rationally complain that he has been deprived of
any property right.
III.
THE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT REQUIRES
BENNION TO PAY HIS PROPORTIONATE SHARE
OF THE WELL'S EXPENSE
As the Board's calculation- of Bennion's royalty accumulations shows (Order of April 30, 1981 at 5), no costs were
deducted from his 12-1/2 percent royalty computed on production
until the well's payout.

As to production after payout,

Bennion received 100 percent of his working interest share of
proceeds less his proportionate share of drilling and operating
expenses.

Bennion complains that the Board erred in subtract-

ing these expenses from his working interest share of proceeds.

He argues that his statutory royalty is not "cost free"

if expenses incurred before payout are deducted from his working interest accumulation.
The Board subtracted a portion of the drilling and
operating costs from Bennion's working interest share of proceeds because the Oil and Gas Conservation Act required it to
do so.

The last sentence of the current section 40-6-6(g) re-

quires, as part of each pooling order, that the nonconsenting
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owner's share of production be diminished py an amount equal to
(1) 100 percent of his share of surface equipment and operating
costs from first production, and (2) up to 150 .. percent of his
share of the costs of wellsite preparation, drilling, testing,
completing and reworking the well.

The pre-1977 version of the

same statute required a similar deduction, but in less detail.
Thus the superseded version of section 40-6-6(g) provided:
"The order shall determine the interest of each
owner in the unit, and may provide in substance
that ... as to each owner who does not agree, he
shall be entitled to receive from the person ...
drilling and operating the well on the unit his
share of the production applicable to his interest, after the person or persons drilling and
operating said well have recovered the share of
the cost of drilling and operating applicable to
such nonconsenting owner's interest plus a reasonable charge for supervision and storage."
(Emphasis added.)
Bennion therefore incorrectly supposes that the pre1977 statute does not require subtraction of his share of expenses.

The Court need not decide whether the old or new

statute applies here, for both versions require subtraction of
at least 100 percent of the portion of expenses attributable
to Bennion's working interest.

IV.
BENNION IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
ON HIS WORKING INTEREST ACCOUNT
Bennion claims Shell should have been required to pay
him, in effect, prejudgment interest on his $57,887.93 working
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interest accumulation.

He argues that since the Board awarded
~

him interest on his royalty accumulations, it should have
treated his working interest the same.
In Utah, prejudgment interest is awarded as "damages
due to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount owing
under an obligation."

L&A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Construe-

tion Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980).

Bennion had no right

to share in the proceeds of production -- and Shell had no
obligation to pay Bennion such proceeds -- until the Board
entered its interim pooling order of March 26, 1980.
cussion in Part IIA of this argument.)

(See dis-

Since Shell deposited

Bennion's working interest accumulations in an interest-bearing
account for Bennion's benefit immediately after the issuance of
the March 1980 interim order, he cannot logically claim interest on an antecedent debt.

In short, Shell had no obligation

to pay Bennion his working interest prior to the time when
Shell in fact paid him the full sum determined by the Board.
As to why the Board treated Bennion's royalty and
working interest differently for purposes of accruing interest,
we need only point out that the Board has historically viewed
royalty as an obligation preexisting its own pooling orders.
As demonstrated by the Board's decision in In re Bennion,
Cause No. 139-18 (a copy of which appears as Appendix No. 8 to
Bennion's brief), the Board is of the view that the landowner's
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right to a royalty exists irrespective of any action that the
0

Board might take, while his right to a ful1 working interest is
entirely dependent upon the entry of a pooling ·order.

Although

Shell does not agree with the Board's analysis of the Oil and
Gas Conservation Act in this regard (see discussion at page 15
and accompanying note, supra), it explains the reason why the
Board refused Bennion interest on his working interest accumulations.*

Significantly, both Shell and the Board agree that

since Shell had no obligation to pay Bennion his working interest until the interim pooling order was entered herein, it had
no obligation to pay interest on those accumulations prior to
the entry of that order.

v.
THE BOARD CORRECTLY REFUSED TO REQUIRE SHELL
TO TRANSPORT ITS RECORDS TO SALT LAKE CITY
Bennion's final and most remarkable contention in this
appeal is that the Board should have required Shell to transport its well records from Houston, Texas, where they are kept
and continuously used, to his lawyer's office in Salt Lake

* In In re Malnar, Cause No. 131-26 (Sept. 17, 1975), the
Board did not award interest on the applicant's working interest accoun-t~as Bennion contends. At page 3 of the Board's
' case (reproduced as Appendix
. 6 to Bennion
. 's
order in that
brief), the Board stated that interest would only be applied to
the applicant's royalty. In re Armstrong, Cause No. 140-8
(Sept. 14, 1975), which Bennion also cites, invol~ed nei~her
royalties or working interest, and is completely inapposite.
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City.

This contention is remarkable becau~e Bennion offers no

plausible explanation (1) why his Houston accountants did not
perform an adequate audit of Shell's records in. Houston, where
they were given full access to those records, (2) why the
voluminous accounting records already provided Bennion's counsel did not apprise him of the facts he requires, and (3) why,
if Bennion was dissatisfied with his Houston accountants, he
did not take advantage of the Board's order that Shell pay the
expenses of his lawyer, his Salt Lake City accountant and of
Bennion himself, to travel to Houston to review Shell's records
in person.

Nor does Bennion suggest a single reason why his

desire to look at Shell's records in Salt Lake City would outweigh the enormous inconvenience to Shell of sending its working files to Salt Lake City.*
Bennion argues that he was treated unfairly because he
was "compelled to employ accountants he was unfamiliar with"
and because all of the well's records were not "available" to

*

Shell's accounting supervisor testified before the Board
that Shell's original cost documents (invoices, drop tickets,
etc.) are not maintained on a well basis, but are maintained on
a chronological basis in one of two locations in Houston, depending on the age of the document.
(Tr. of Dec. 18, 1980 at
19-20). Revenue records are located in another facility in
Houstin (id. at 26), and are likewise maintained on a chronological basis rather than a well basis (id. at 29).
Shell
codes all such data with well designations, which enables Shell
to produce computer summaries of revenue and expense on a well
basis.
Shell Ex. 23 is this type of summary.
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those accountants.

(Appellant's Brief at 23).

Neither Shell

nor the Board, however, compelled Bennion°to hire anyone; the
identity of his accountants is his affair.

The accountants he

hired, moreover, had unrestricted access to Shell's records and
the assistance of Shell's accounting staff to perform their
audit.

Shell's accounting supervisor testified to the Board

that Bennion's audit team received Shell's full cooperation.
(Tr. of Dec. 18, 1980 at 25-27).

During Bennion's Houston

audit, one set of allocation records was not readily available,
but Shell retrieved the records and notified Bennion's auditors that they were available.
returned to review them.

His auditors, however, never

(Id. at 26-27).

The only "evidence"

before the Board of the alleged inadequacy of Shell's accounting was a statement by Bennion's counsel.

Asked whether

Bennion believed there was a discrepancy between Shell's summaries and the audit report prepared by Bennion's accountants,
Mr. Stirba replied:
"The only think I can say about that ... is this
is what we got from [Bennion's accountants] and
... it is by and large unsatisfactory. There are
some aspects of this accounting which may very
well be unsatisfactory because of the performance
of the gentlemen who performed the audit, but
there are also indications, at least in this,
that there were certain documents they couldn't
get.
So far as a huge discrepancy, quite frankly, I would have to say, "No," but based upon
this information, it's not very easy for us to
ascertain exactly what these gentlemen are saying."
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(Id. at 34-35).
s

Neither the "unsatisfactory performance" of Bennion's
chosen accountants nor his problems in
need concern this Court.

communi~ating

with them,

Bennion had the opportunity to exa-

mine Shell's records; regardless whether he took full advantage
of that opportunity, no purpose would be served now in requiring Shell to deliver its records to Salt Lake City.

Although

courts and administrative bodies usually have the discretion to
specify the place for the examination of a party's records, the
general rule is that inspection should take place at the producing party's office during regular business hours "so as to
interfere as little as possible with the carrying on of the
producing party's business operations."
(1963).

83 A.L.R. 2d 309

See also 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deposition and Discovery

§298 (1965); 27 C.J.S. Discovery §82 (1959); Mid-American
Facilities, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 78 F.R.D. 497 (E.D.
Wisc. 1978); Beryl v. U.S. Smelting, Rfg.
Misc.2d 382, 228 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1962).

& Mining

Co., 34

The Board made every

effort to assist Bennion in examining Shell's records, and this
Court cannot second-guess the Board without some showing of
extraordinary need on Bennion's part.

The Board's order was in

this respect perfectly reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Bennion has tried to take unfair advantage of
every effort of Shell and the Board to resolve this dispute.
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His claim for production in

~ind

from the date of first produc-

tion would give him a huge bonus for shirking the risks of exploration and drilling--risks undertaken by Shell and six other
mineral interest owners in the unit.

Utah law provides no

basis for his claims, and he has failed to demonstrate that the
Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously in any respect.

The

judgment of the District Court dismissing Bennion's claims
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this {gi'\-.. day of j~~~l)-'~~

1982.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
By

{)D_t.~·

Alan L. Sullivan
Paul M. Durham
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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